

Group Oedipus and primary scene. Insertions and contaminations between virtual and archaic

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Abstract

The author revisits the Oedipus in its complex and group dimension, and the possible saturating and inhibiting effects of grafting the virtual into the imaginary dimension of the primary scene. The idea of the family as protective container isolated from the social is only an idealization of the child and of the first Freud, who however later perceives the group aspects of the Oedipus and considers the primary scene to be an original phantoms that mediates between history and structure. The group aspects of the Oedipus are revisited through the conceptions of Bion and Bollas, while the concept of primary scene is extended to the concept of emotional field in which the child lives from birth and placed in relation to the concept of original phantoms. It is at this primitive and undifferentiated level that the primary scene performs its work of suturing the originary and that the concepts of obscenity and topical transference can meet with Bion's proto-mental theory and field concept. The primary scene, as an imaginary referent and a phantom on the origin, is the most suitable primordial scheme to perform a suture work with the archaic, and to act as organizer of the development of the emotional field and of the self of the child. In fact, the primary scene mediates between Oedipus and the group, between the imaginary and the archaic, between the real and the virtual, and it is rooted directly in the primary ambiguity, in the psycho-somatic indifferenciation and in the intersubjective plot. The new media, the virtual/real confusion are therefore not harmful in themselves, but they can become harmful when the parental mediation fails, and the child is left alone in front of an omnipotent and unfiltered source of images that takes on the value of a, infinite and continuous primary scene, which sutures the archaic, grafting a monstrous and meaningless imaginary, which displaces the child from any possible transformation.

Key words : group Oedipus, primary scene, field theory, archaic/inaccessible unconscious, virtual/real

Oedipus sunset or Oedipus at sunset?

Freud perfectly understood that the story of Oedipus is a metaphor for the story of all of us, and using a fragment of the *Oedipus King* of Sophocles, he built psychoanalysis, which tried to overturn the world. Not without controversy. To argue that the so-called Oedipus complex is a universal kinship structure, or even just of our tired western civilization, is a question that has never stopped fueling contrasts between psychoanalysis and anthropology. In his search for the kinship atom, Levi-

Strauss (1958) preferred the maternal uncle, as more universal structure and operator of the exchange of women and thought that a man could not obtain a woman if not from another man, in the form of daughter or sister. Current psychoanalysis no longer seems so sure of the place to be attributed to the Oedipus complex, and I don't know if the network has permanently taken the place of the maternal uncle, but even if it were, I don't think we should be too sorry.

What about the criticisms of Michel Serres (2015), who dismisses the tendency of psychologists of all orientations to build personal identity through parental relationships as a “strange and narrow limitation” ? For the philosopher, the construction of identity does not proceed exclusively from the human environment, but also from the relationship with all other beings, animals and plants, and even the rocks and water that surround us. The idea that reducing the construction of human identity to the family circle or worse to the parental couple, is a true “regression”, is also supported by Christopher Bollas (1992), a psychoanalyst who thinks that our adult relationships, as a couple, family and also ideological and political, are actually necessary regressions, which have the function of comforting us in the face of the acute complexity of life. And yet there is no psychological or psychoanalytic theory that does not highlight the importance of caring for and the quality of relationships in the earliest stages of life. Authors of each trend show an unusual agreement in attributing to the family the function of modulator of mental pain, which remains a central task in the development of the child and his ability to learn to tolerate contact with the internal and external world, transform primitive emotions and develop symbolization processes. The parental care figures maintain the centrality as mediators of the suffering and traumatic nature of reality, as of any form of learning, and the shortcomings or distortions of these functions remain the basis of much of psychopathology. After all, when authors such as Bion and Winnicott placed the quality of the relationship at the center of the development of the mind and pathology, weakening the importance of the constitutional aspect, they made a real revolution in the pathogenesis and therapy of mental disorder. Recent studies on technological addictions therefore tend to trace these psychopathologies to the various forms of emotional neglect in the early years of life (La Barbera, 2005 ; Schimmenti, 2008).

The Oedipus, in its various forms, therefore seems to maintain a firm position as an organizer of the mental development of the child. And yet clinical work continually confronts us with an increasingly “complex”, “decomposed” and “split” Oedipus in its various components, that are “disseminated” and in resonance with the outside world, a group Oedipus, that is fragmented, revolving around to a composite, cryptic, disturbing primary scene, whose phantom oscillates between internalization and outsourcing, between family violence and social violence. Indeed, the primary scene seems to merge with an imaginary, which drawing directly from the network, saturates the erotic and oedipal fantasies of perverse, violent and strongly hypnotic images. For an already “confused” pre-adolescent, these images can take on a highly

traumatic value, making the connection with the peer group difficult and loading the suture work with the archaic of monstrous and difficult to tolerate values. The reorganization of the internal group seems to stop, and the pre-adolescent risks perching on regressive positions. The network's imagery contaminates and replaces the child's imagination by taking on the value of an inelaborable primary scene. This disturbing clinical observation requires confirmations and investigations, but rather than an Oedipus at sunset, it would seem rather to indicate its complexification and complication, linked to a greater split in the nuclear family and to a greater contamination between virtual and imaginary. The paradoxical result is that of a more regressive Oedipus, castled on split positions, of dual links, which makes growth and socialization difficult. In this position, the primary scene takes on a traumatic effect, difficult to elaborate, which pushes some preadolescents to refuse the homogenerational passage with the peer group. In this perspective, it seemed urgent to rethink the Oedipus in its complex and group dimension, and the possible saturating and inhibiting effects of grafting the virtual into the imaginary dimension of the primary scene.

Oedipus complex or complex Oedipus?

Is the Oedipus complex already a complex Oedipus? Is the idea of the family as a protective container isolated from the social only an idealization of the child and the first Freud? In other words, is the contrast between family and group a real conflict or rather a conflict linked to a simplification that belongs to the phantoms of the child?

In fact, already in Sophocles we see a complex representation in which various contrasting characters and events alternate on the scene ... and the conflicts are always and immediately public and familiar, intrapsychic and relational. If there is a family, this is the adoptive family of Corinth, an ideal family, but distant and absent, an abstraction of the mind, which Freud "forgets", ending up with "projecting" his Oedipus complex into a family that in reality there never was.

For Freud (1921) "The boy shows a particular interest in his father, he would like to become and be like him, to replace him in all respects" and when "The little boy notes that the father blocks his path mother; his identification with the father now takes on a hostile color and ends up coinciding with the desire to replace the father also with the mother". For this Abraham (1922) can read the scene of the Skiste odòs as the representation of the contention for the maternal genital. Killed the father-King, Oedipus will only have to win the Sphinx to access the mother-queen. It is the primacy of sexuality, which is not without consequences: it overshadows violence, and gives the Oedipus complex a strictly individual connotation. It is the condition of "son", to which I would add, "beloved", that which for Napolitani (1987) pushes Freud to speak with the "voice of the blood", which reifies the subject of psychoanalysis as a product of biological sexuality, keeping it in a reductionist and

individual vision. But as Bion and Winnicott have indicated, the real leap from “naturalness” to “culturality”, from the “instinctual” man to the “symbolic” man, is achieved only in the ways of creativity, both as transition from beta area to alpha area, from concrete to symbolic, both as defusion from the relational *continuum* mother-child, and entry into the transitional area. In Bion (1963) it is the oedipal complex that is characterized by an epistemophilic instinct, by a contrasted search for truth, in Winnicott (1971) it is the process of foundation of subjectivity, which takes place in the game of the intermediate area and calls into question creativity that is never separated from the environment.

The development of an Oedipus group concept therefore implies a social and cultural vision that is not easy to integrate into the psychoanalytic model. When he realizes that in the groups Oedipal figures emerge Bion (1961) sketches some very Kleinian descriptions, he speaks of a group perceived as one fragmented individual, which contains another hidden individual, waiting, of partial objects, of the breast and of the mother’s body, which contains other objects ... The situation is complex, bizarre, and Bion admits that the psychoanalytic conception of the primary scene is not developed enough for groups. Bion (1963) criticizes the excessive weight that Freud attributes to the sexual component of the Oedipus and speculates that even this cannot be understood if it is not related to the other elements of the drama. Then he tries a first synthesis of a group conception of Oedipus, introducing the concept of “Oedipal situation”, which widens the investigation to the relationships between parents and the child and replace into the Oedipus the characters and events that Freud had neglected: the Sphinx, Tiresias, the pestilence, the suicide of the Sphinx and Jocasta, the assassination of the king ... The myth of Oedipus then becomes a myth about knowledge, in which the K (Knowledge) link is added to the L (Love) and H (Hate) links, and together with the myths of Eden and the tower of Babel, becomes the keystone to understand mental growth, supported by curiosity, but also by the challenge against an almighty god who opposes knowledge. And this almighty god becomes that part of the personality that actively opposes knowledge and contact with reality, internal and external.

The Freudian conception of the Oedipus complex receives no less serious criticism from anthropology. Vernant (1972) in his *Œdipe sans complexe* stresses that Oedipus kills his father and possesses his mother precisely because he does not recognize them as such, undermining the very assumptions of the Oedipus complex. Vernant’s criticisms echo those of Girard (1972) who in his “mimetic model” attributes violence to a central value, as an inevitable product of mimesis, which by making desire converge on a single object, becomes a mimetic, contagious and unstoppable. Like the disciple, the child imitates the wishes of the master-father, but the profound asymmetry of the relationship does not allow him to understand that his desire is a threat. Only the adult can interpret the child’s movements as a desire for usurpation, and this is what drives the father to violence and retaliation. Attributing to the child an awareness of rivalry is therefore a “glaring implausibility”, the child is rather

placed in a sort of “mimetic double bind”, so on the one hand he suffers the injunction to be like the father, and on the other the injunction not to be like the father. However, I do not think that it is enough to resort to the double bind theory to overcome the contradictions that Freud leaves open. Especially since in the *Ego and the Id* Freud (1922) he had already glimpsed the idea of a double bind. Beside the admonition “So (like the father) you have to be”, Freud also postulates the presence of the prohibition: “So (like the father) you are not allowed to be”, which comes from the Super Ego, expression of the collapse of the Oedipus complex. Freud sensed that identification implies ambivalence from the beginning, and that if the child is identified with the father, he can only occupy his place with the mother, but seems to grasp only that, in the magical work of omnipotence childish, is equivalent to killing the father.

It is Bollas’ position (1993) that every child married his mother, killed his father and survived. A provocation that had not escaped Sophocles when he made Jocasta say “You do not fear the wedding with your mother: many mortals already lay in a dream with their mother, but whoever gives no value to these things lives more easily” (vs. 980-2). Bollas’ itinerary starts from the enveloping atmospheres of Winnicott's intimate and almighty mother-child unit, but his conclusions arrive at a complex and unusual Oedipus that opens up to a group conception of Oedipus and reveals the oscillation family-group. Mother-child intimacy is a child’s right, and a good father is willing to recognize its legitimacy and even to favor it. However, each child comes to understand that the father preceded him in the relationship with the mother, and this painful discovery leads to a “recognition” that informs him of his position and the desires that preceded him. It is this recognition that represents true identification for male and female. Paradoxically, it is the emergence of genitality in the child that interrupts intimacy with the mother, which pushes the mother to move him from the place he had as a child, and place him in “his place”, allowing the child to discover the patrilineal order that destroys the illusion deriving from its privileged place in the matrilineal order. Identification with the father cannot take place on the basis of castration anxiety, but in the awareness of the child and the family group of the place that everyone has within the family system. The child gradually discovers that omnipotence is not enough to satisfy his desires, that the world around him is not only according to his needs, that he lives in a family that is not only the mother, but rather a “complex group family”, with brothers and sisters, the parents of the father and mother, uncles and aunts, and that there are other families other than his. The family therefore loses that intimacy of the matriarchal line and becomes a “group”, in which the child discovers the complexity, of the patriarchal line, of multiple and generational relationships, the history of the family and therefore the family novel. Of course, the child struggles to accept the complexity of the family group, and often remains stuck in the oedipal dilemma, because dual ties are more reassuring and the child prefers to remain attached to the influence of the individual.

The group challenges identity, dissolves individual authorities, and the child begins to face the problems of justice and finds that invoking the name of the father or mother is not enough to have justice. This is the theme of *Antigone*, and as in the tragedy, even in the family group a gap emerges between family justice and that of the polis. For the child, the social meeting place is the school, in which it is seen whether or not he has solved his oedipal dilemma. The child who has passed the Oedipus complex manages to accept the group, otherwise he refuses to be with peers, clings to the mother or the father's law. It is the adolescent, isolated, and "grandiose" that Meltzer describes (1991). On the threshold of puberty, the child discovers that his questions go beyond what his parents know, who basically ignore "how to make children"; confusion and identity crisis emerge, which lead the adolescent to struggle in the conflict whether to go on to become an adult, or go back to childhood to recover the lost world of beauty, the charm of intimacy and the security of attachment. The isolation and the search for a totalizing first love are sometimes offered as attempts to escape from the chaos of group dynamics, but for a teenager, feeling accepted and enjoying the approval of the peer group is absolutely vital.

The main event, however, is the discovery of the mind. Before, the child could conceive mental contents as external events, painful thoughts, images and emotions that magically possessed him and that he could project into the external world or metabolize with the help of parents. The unstoppable development, however, resembles a series of catastrophes, and it is during this painful trajectory that the teenager discovers what Bollas calls the "semi-independent entity" of his mind. The collapse of the matrilineal world, with the discovery of the family-group, and that of the patriarchal world, in the encounter with the social group, corresponds to a collapse of the psychic structure and a conflict between competing internal objects, which leads the child to discover that he is a psychic entity with a mind divided between conscious logics and unconscious and uncontrollable logics. This is what characterizes the oedipal child's epiphany, not the fear of castration. The discovery of a mind in which murderous thoughts, envy, guilt, wild thoughts, transgressive and disorientating sexual ideas emerge under the pressure of the hormonal tide and all sorts of stimuli, is a catastrophic event, for which external trauma, the mistreatment, punishment is added by the discovery that the mind itself is an uncontrolled, self-traumatizing agent. The teenager is therefore at war with the external group, just as he is at war with the internal group, but he cannot do without the group, as he cannot do without the mind. Bion's observation of the link between the functioning of the group and the functioning of the basic mental organization, internal grouping, is therefore a basic discovery for contemporary psychoanalysis. This organization, in which the multiple precedes unity and whose functioning is closer to the corporeal than to the mental, has an autarchic and magical character, independent of time and objective reality, and is based on the hypothesis of the "proto-mental system". Bion keeps this hypothesis as a imaginative conjecture and narrative formulation of an internal group life, whereby the life of the mind implies a sort of internal dialogue, a

kind of polyphonic choir, which can be concordant or discordant. This hypothesis pushes Meltzer (1986) to conjecture a clash between systems, a sort of political conflict between the parts most attuned to the basic emotional level and the thinking but less authentic parts. The terms of this conflict revolve between the fear of expulsion from the group and the reward of a place in the system of power.

The Self is therefore multiple, but the discovery of the multiplicity of the Self and the complexity implicit in the realization of having one's own mind is often too difficult to bear. For this reason Bollas (1992) argues that in the face of the pain of complexity people go to meet a regression, a retreat, essential for survival. Psychic development is therefore not only evolutionary, but also de-evolutionary, it does not proceed only to assembly, but also to the disassembly of early childhood structures. Marriage, associations, are part of this regression, and in fact represent a return to the family, to go forward we go back to the places of the father and mother, to the places where we can evoke these figures as benevolent, and as alternatives to madness, always latent in groups, both in those of social life and in split groups of mental life. The development of a false self and the illusion of self unity can therefore help to endure the madness of the group and reality, because they allow to generate false, as useful illusions, to calm the anguish of complexity. We withdraw into dyadic affiliations transformed, into triadic structures when we create our family, we take refuge in univocal convictions of reality, such as psychoanalytic, political, theological ... even if they are all occasions for pain ... but the mentally objectible dilemma is always preferable to complexity that goes beyond mental processing. The primary adult relationships of couples and families, ideological and political ones, are therefore necessary regressions, simplified structures transformed to comfort us with the acute complexity of life. In fact, we live at the center of two profound symbolic orders, our mind and that of the group, which destroy symbiotic and oedipal cohesions. This is why we sometimes withdraw from the anguish of having a mind and living in a social order that destroys the structures of early childhood and deprives us of the illusion of unity. The mind however continues to develop in complexity, so it is necessary to find an inner sanctuary, a productive kindergarten, which allows us to play with reality, to bring our subjectivity into the world of objects and at the same time to give reality to our life in one intermediate space.

Oedipus and the group. Certainties and uncertainties of psychoanalysis

Psychoanalysis for truth has shown uncertainties and second thoughts on the concept of group Oedipus. Despite having a long group practice, Anzieu (1976), leads the Oedipus in the groups to a pseudo-organizer with a defensive function against the pregenital regression, reaching as far as possible to recognize to the therapeutic groups an "intermediate" status between family and group (Anzieu, 1984). A "hybrid" solution had also been followed by Bion (1961), when he recognizes the family group as the basic model for all groups, but maintains the belief that the main source of group behavior is to be found in psychotic anxieties. The concept of

internal grouping remains firm, and although there is a clear link between the functioning of the group and internal grouping, it still appears difficult to combine the principles of the group with the primary functions of the family and to understand the functions of the group in the evolutionary process of the subject. Aspects that only thanks to the work on therapeutic groups with adolescents and pre-adolescents will be partially clarified.

Transformations of the primary scene in adolescent groups

In adolescence, the reorganization of the mental structure implies profound upheavals of the internal group. In this process, the adolescent must transform a part of his internal groups, in particular the primary scene, which is replaced by a phantasm of self-generation. The group illusion facilitates the release from family organizers in peer groups, as indicated by the natural propensity of adolescents for groups. The peer group can therefore be a precious resource as long as it does not stabilize in a pathological way. In this turmoil of catastrophes and transformations, the primary scene undergoes an inevitable restructuring, moving from the fantasized sexual scene of the parents to the homogenerational fantasized sexual scene, in which the young adult can find his place through disidentifications and new identifications (Chapelier, 2019). The primary scene also has a complex function of “imaginary referent”, which Duez (2000) places at the base of the ability to organize all the components of subjectivity through a work of suturing the original. Articulating the concept of obscenity, which analyzes the staging of subjectivity; the work of the death instinct, linked to the other; and the role of the original phantasms in the game between Real and Imaginary, Duez, tries to overcome the fictitious opposition between realist theory and phantasmic theory of seduction and to reconsider the individual/group dichotomy according to the complexity in which the division of the subject appears articulated between singularity/groupality/otherness. Duez takes advantage of the Freudian theory of original phantasms that Green’s (1991) work relates to infantile sexual theories, as an articulation between ontogenesis and phylogeny, between history and structure, placing infantile sexual theories - penis universality, conception, birth - in the register of ontogenesis, and the original phantasms - abstraction, seduction, return to the womb - in phylogenesis through the articulation of the Oedipus. In the middle the primary scene, which mediates between history and structure. Already in Freud, therefore, the Oedipus goes towards a group dimension and the original phantasms have an imaginary structure, of *urszene*, or of primordial patterns, as Green prefers, which belong to phylogenesis, and which resemble Bionian pre-conceptions. In Freud the traumatic and the phantasmatic therefore mix in the primary scene, and if the typical “Urszene” refers to the scene of the coitus of the parents, the primary scene as a scheme alludes to the originary, which is presented in the form of a phantasm, a mass on the scene of archaic psychic events that fish in the imagination. Each original phantasm therefore refers to the primary

scene, which requires the absent subject to occupy an imaginary position in the primordial group.

Starting from this Freudian basis, Duez (2000) sees in the original phantasm the staging of bodily or psychic experiences related to the figure of the other, which have to do with the ambiguity, radical undecidability and uncertainty that characterize the first link between the child and the mother. The original therefore refers to psychic formations that the child has brought with him since birth and which give a direction to individual experience. Duez follows Piera Aulagnier's (1975) indications of an original as a primitive form of psychic development characterized by the idea of self-generation and articulated through the primary pictograms of link or rejection. In the primary scene, which takes place in a psychic space of necessity and dependence on the link with the other, the subject is typically called to live the experience of loneliness and exclusion.

In this inscription of an "out of enjoyment" linked to the primary scene, Duez therefore founds the principle of liking with others. The original phantom holds the function of the other in what Duez calls obscenity, which establishes a figure oscillating between the traumatic construction of the relationship with the other (alteration) and the symbolic construction of the relationship with the other (otherness). The retrieval of obscenity and his work therefore allows a more extensive reading of the original phantasms, and provides the possibility of using them as a generic paradigm of internal groups and their transformative function. The concept of obscenity therefore attempts to show the dynamics of elusive clinical phenomena such as the adolescent and borderline tendency to play their subjectivity on a complex external scene, in which he remains involved, with an obscenity effect. Obscenity is therefore "a figural relationship that structures a very archaic background, that one of ambiguity" (*ibidem*, 89)" understood in the sense of Bleger, as an experience in which the subject is unable to differentiate what depends on himself from what depends on the other. Because of his ambiguous situation, the teenager is forced to obscenealize many of the intense pulsional experiences he lives, of love or hate, but also destructive related to the death instinct. There is no crossing of adolescence without meeting the idea of murder or suicide. The idea of killing the other of desire, or of the intruder (the other inside) has the function of eliminating ambiguity. The notion of obscenity therefore animates in a figural sense the original interface between the subject and the others, which Duez declines in Lacanian terms, to express the psychic plurality of the subject and the crucible of an intersubjectivity through which the subject tries to differentiate himself. The original obscenity therefore founds the possibility of these trans-subjective experiences and shows the persistent ambiguity between the other and the object. Each critical situation therefore implies an emergence of the archaic, a confrontation of the subject with the Freudian perturbing that becomes an indicator of obscenity, in that the original crisis of the

confrontation of an internal group dissociated with the meeting of other disturbing and perturbing.

Returning to the primary scene Chapelier (2000; 2019), it shows how it is essential for the adolescent to go through the group of peers to transform the family internal group. The primary scene is unbearable for a teenager because it induces passivity and unbridled excitement, hence the implementation of a series of shifts that allow the teenager to take an active part in it. In front of the primary scene, the peer group evokes scenes of violent movements of oral incorporation, cannibalistic scenes, of one of the two parents, usually that one of the same sex. In order to access transgenerational filiation, the adolescent needs to get rid of the oedipal influence as the only organizer, because post-oedipal identifications are mostly insufficient to allow the adolescent to enter the filiation.

Hence the question of the “parricide”, which Freud (1912-3) had tackled in *Totem and Taboo*, re-emerges. Already Abadi (1978) had highlighted the need to reconsider parricide within a struggle for power, rather than for the elimination of the sexual rival. Chapelier (2000) notes that the killing of the father by the united brothers cancels the generational gap and the desire itself for the mother, as the group of brothers is a self-generated group. Self-generation therefore becomes a constitutive phantasm of the egalitarian society and the ban on incest establishes the legitimacy of a homogenerational sexuality, safeguarding the group’s narcissistic omnipotence. Chapelier therefore identifies two types of pathologies, one for *excess of family grouping*, and the other for *excess of horizontal grouping*. In the first, the teenager cannot process the primary scene and remains in a position of passivity, which prevents the teenager from taking his own psychic independence, leaving him entangled in a childish position. In the second, the danger of dependence on the peer group prevails, which by replacing the family group, prevents a true modulation of the detachment from the family and prevents the work of mourning necessary for growth, the result of which is a position of struggle with society and the family. and the only rules are those of the group-gang, with which young people associate themselves on the modality of group illusion.

Obscenality, primary scene and field theory

Duez (2000) derives the notion of obscenality from the concept of obscenity, as opposed to the concept of objectivity, which implies a radical exclusion of the subject out of the object, while obscenity implies a persistence of the subject on the scene. The concept of obscenity therefore tries to grasp the original interface between the subject and the external group, with its poles of attachment and excitement. Duez declines his concept within the Freudian theory of psychic space oriented by pulsional investments, and the Lacanian notions of Imaginary, Real and Symbolic. However, the author suggests that many other phenomenal manifestations can be seen as actualization effects of obscenality, in particular Bion’s basic assumptions,

Foulkes' resonance, Kaës's internal groups, Neri's commuting, effectively opening to an extended conception of obscenity.

If we broaden the concept of psychic space oriented in the phenomenological perspective of Merleau-Ponty, we can in fact place obscenity in a broader perspective. Merleau-Ponty retrieves the lesson of the last Freud of a somatic psychic, arriving at an original conception of the unconscious as a somatic navel of being. Merleau-Ponty (1964, 281) observes that "Freud's philosophy is not philosophy of the body but of the flesh", does not give "causality chains", but indicates the "polymorphism", the "differentiations" of our adhesion to the flesh of the world, in the sense of dimensionality, rather than the hierarchy of orders. Between intentional and affective, facts and potentiality, sensitive and intelligible, visible and invisible, there would be no contrast of characters, radical distinction, but a relationship of mutual implication and reciprocal postponement of chiasma. The unconscious is not the other absolute of the conscious, but its border of encroachment, whereby visible and invisible, conscious and unconscious, are not found in a relationship of ontological heterogeneity, but of mutual incorporation. The Merleau-Pontian subject is at the limit of conscious and unconscious, inhabits the margins of these concepts, is the hinge: "This unconscious to look for, not at the bottom of us, behind our 'conscience', but in front of us, as articulations of our field" (*ibidem* p.197). For this reason Merleau-Ponty (*ibidem*, 205) can say in an extraordinary formula that "perception is unconscious", anticipating Libet's (2004) considerations on the influence of the unconscious in perception, Bion's ideas of proto- mental and hallucinosis (Rugi, 2015; 2017), but above all the current conception of the field, as is now recognized by many authors (Rugi, 2011; Ferro and Civitarese, 2015).

Of course the relations of obscenity with field theory are all to be studied, but the hypothesis that this concept can create a sort of representation of the forces that animate the field, starting from the primary scene as an imaginary referent, seems suggestive. I remember that authors such as Meltzer (1973) and Gaburri (1993) had already attempted this operation when they had extended the concept of primary scene to the emotional field in which the child has lived since birth: family atmospheres, attending to parents' speeches, tender, quarrelsome, violent, full of plans or fears, which somehow expose him to a feeling of exclusion.

Gaburri (1993) postulates that the experience of exclusion-inclusion in the primary scene is a necessary step for the development of the language of the mind. After the meeting-dialogue with the mother's mind - which absorbs, contains and makes liveable the anguish of death - the event of exclusion linked to the primary scene becomes an element which is essential to experience. Exclusion would in fact have the power to stimulate a series of pulsional elements, from excitement to epistemophilic pulsion, arriving at the desire to communicate and to know which coincides with the desire to belong to that world of links from which one feels excluded. When the ability to defer desire is sufficiently adequate and does not feed

an excess of resentment, then it is possible to face the experience of the feeling of exclusion that contributes to developing the link between the language of the mind and the actual language. The primary scene therefore constitutes the emotional field, in which the link between the child and the parents is realized, and revolves around the experiences of inclusion and exclusion, which, if correctly measured, develop a desire for affective and linguistic belonging in the child.

Starting from this broader theoretical framework, in which we read an evident desire to mediate between Freud and Bion, the concept of obscenity could open up to interesting convergences with the current field theory. As an attempt to grasp the psychic space oriented by the subject's instinctual investment relationships with one's body, the somatic, the intrapsychic, the intersubjective and the environment, obscenity could represent a sort of dynamic scenography that draws the passage from a naive primary scene, to a complex phantasmatic scene, which sinks into the imaginary and the archaic, animating itself with powerful forces that condition and guide the dynamics of the emotional field. Obscenity, and the topical transference that accompanies it, come into play in the intersubjective and group aspects, in which relationships are dominated by phantasms of devouring, incorporating, fragmenting with partial and split objects and archaic experiences of ambiguity, confusion and psyche-soma and self-other undifferentiation. Due to topical transference, Duez means an original transference characterized by a diffraction and reversal functioning, typical of groups and dreams, which supports the diffraction of the pulsional pushes of the participants towards others and the figurality of the dream scene. This is the constant background in which obscenity and topical transference operate, articulating the relationship between the Self and others, and which Duez brings closer to the basic mentality of the Bionian group. If I understand correctly, it is at this very primitive and undifferentiated level that the primary scene does its "work of suturing the originary" and that the concepts of obscenity and topical transference can meet with Bion's proto-mental and the theory of field (Duez, 2000, p.102). Following Jeammet (1980), however, Duez differentiates the concept of obscenity from that one of projective identification, and entrusts the movements of the topical transference to the desire and the death pulsion (understood as the desire for non-desire), confining it to a more advanced position, that of the "enlarged psychic space", in which the adolescent entrusts to others the function of limiting instances, of the superegoic type. For this reason, Duez (2000; 2020) can refer the organization of his groups to the instances of Freud's second topical, and to the oral, anal and phallic organization, which in a group field view appear of dubious utility, as Bion had punctually observed, and as Wallerstein (1991) himself admits, who defines the Freudian macro-concepts -Ego, Es, Super-Ego- "excessively global, too far from experience". In a field conception, especially when investigating such primitive phenomena, it is in fact preferable to think in terms of energy and projective identification, (Corrao, 1986; 1993) or of contagion of emotions, (Cimino and Correale, 2005), rather than of transference and desire. Moreover, Bion uses concepts

with a strong biological significance, such as valence and tropism, to indicate the disposition always present in the individual to enter into combination with the group and his tendency to determine the Basic Assumptions and to act according to them. But behind these concepts the forces that animate the field are creativity, narcissism and hate, while projective identification is the activity that allows these forces to evolve or destroy the objects that are gradually brought into play. Bion (1992), in *Cogitations*, in fact connects tropisms to projective identification, such as the search for an object to kill or to be killed by, an object to create or from which to be created, a parasite or a guest. Going to place the deep origins of groupality in concepts such as valence, tropism, proto-mental system, basic assumptions that act as a hinge between individual and group, instinct and relationship, mind and body, Bion therefore paved the way for the study of difficult individual/group relationships and emotional field transformations. The theory of field and transformations thus provides us with the opportunity to study what exorbitates the subject and object of the relationship: “or because on this side of them, like what -instinct, sensation, emotion- does not participate in the symbolic nature of the relationship; or because beyond them, like what projection, hallucination, action has been expelled” (Riolo, 1997).

This does not exclude that the concepts of obscenity and topical transference may have their function within a field theory. The problem is complex, as it is complex for a teenager to move forward, towards desire, dealing with the archaic, where more than desire are the primitive mechanisms of splitting and projective identification that evacuate the parts of the split and fragmented self. Thus this feeds the *affordance* movements in the relationship with the other of the link, and the other who welcomes or rejects. We can therefore think that projective identification is the mechanism through which the phantoms act, in the topical transference, and without which these phantoms would remain mental images, wireless puppets, while obscenity provides an imaginary figuration, a scenography, to the movements of those forces indicated by Bion as narcissism, creativity and hate that shake the bottom of the emotional and intersubjective field starting from the phantoms of the primary scene.

The phantoms of the primary scene can therefore be rethought as a sort of organizer of the emotional field, which structures and directs development, according to the type of emotional link, the relationship with truth, objects, sex, violence and death, which are the elements that characterize and nourish it. The primary scene marks the events and weaves the plot of those relationships that preside over the formation of the Self, in its encounter with significant others and the world, and is inscribed in the mental and bodily memory of the child, tending to repeat itself in its invariants, according to the concept of “model scene” described by J. Lichtenberg (1995). The perceptive and aesthetic determinants of the primary scene are directly inscribed in the child’s psychic, mental and bodily stuff, just when there is no choice, and as Peirce (1980,235) says “a Perceived cannot be rejected and removed at will, not even from his presence in memory. And even less can one prevent himself from perceiving what, as they say, stands out.” This situation is especially true in the child, who for a

long time is completely powerless in the face of perceptive stimuli, who lives in a state of constant constraint and passivity. This opens up important questions regarding the use of the media in childhood, because it tends to recreate in each one those particular conditions of impotence typical of a hypnotic-like condition equivalent to the primary scene. But what happens when a child or a preadolescent repeatedly sees all kinds of sexual scenes on smart-phones and tablets? A 15-year-old patient of mine begins a psychotic crisis when suddenly his mind begins to present him with perverse sexual images of sexual acts with animals. He feels different, he no longer wants to go to school, he closes at home, spends his days on the PC, meditates repeatedly to commit suicide. In therapy he talks about hideous facts he has done, but a profound shame prevents him from telling me about them. Only after a year of therapy did the boy manage to reveal that he used to watch porn movies on websites, and that he had come across gay and animal sex scenes. These scenes continued to recur in his mind as automatic, uncontrollable traumatic scenes, endowed with a hypnotic-like force and a hallucinatory character. The analysis of the case did not allow the naive attribution to these images of a traumatic causal character, rather it revealed a serious difficulty for the patient to elaborate the primary scene with the help of the peer group, being stuck on an oedipal position immature, which prevented him from accessing the peer group. This has transformed the perfect, obedient child, tied to an idealized image of the parents, into the monstrous child who turns out to have an uncontrollable mind and gives birth to unacceptable and meaningless ideas. The new media, the virtual real confusion are therefore not harmful in themselves, but they can become harmful when the parental mediation fails, and the child is left alone in front of an omnipotent and unfiltered source of images that takes on the value of a infinite and continuous primary scene, which sutures the archaic, grafting a monstrous and meaningless imagery, which displaces the child from any elaborative possibility.

The primary scene is therefore always part of the register of the traumatic, as it exposes the infant to the early relationship with the real and to the emotional field created by the presence of objects or their absence, but above all we can speculate that it goes fishing in the archaic, in those “inaccessible states of mind”, (Bion, 1977), or “implicit memory” (Mancia, 2004), which Freud had introduced with the concept of unconscious not removed, and which we now know to be linked to everything that happens in the first three years and even in intrauterine life. Bion (1977,38) recalls that “there might still be traces in the mind or character or the personality, *in the present*, of particles that have a long history, things that we would expect to be fundamental, basic, primordial. [...] archaic states of mind, archaic thoughts and ideas, primitive patterns of behavior ...”. The primary scene, as an imaginary referent and phantom of the origin, is therefore the most suitable primordial scheme for carrying out a suture work with the archaic, and acting as organizer of the development of the emotional field and of the self of the child. In fact, the primary scene mediates between history and structure, between Oedipus and group, imaginary

and real, and fishes directly in the primary ambiguity, in the psycho-soma undifferentiation and in the intersubjective plot. It is the body, and not the disembodied mind, which dominates the scene of intersubjectivity, recalls Stanghellini (2006), in the wake of Merleau-Ponty for whom intersubjectivity is intercorporeity. And this implicit memory, or inaccessible unconscious, does not become part of the autobiographical memory, and can only be expressed in preverbal, infraverbal and bodily ways. It concerns the first experiences between mother and child, mostly sensory, motor, affective, dominated by the rhythm and constancy of bodily stimuli, and by the voice, above all, that surrounds the child with a sound envelope. In this preverbal and pre-symbolic phase the stimuli are characterized by their positive or negative quality, so the experiences that belong to the order of the sensory, the emotional and the traumatic, and therefore to the pain-pleasure system, when they occur before three years, they form the first psychophysiological nucleus of the Self and remain active as implicit memory. In the surface aspects -mimics, gestures, posture- we can therefore find what escapes the removed unconscious, and which nevertheless remains embodied in the implicit memory, or inaccessible unconscious, bearing traces of our early painful and traumatic experiences. In my hypothesis it is at this level that obscenity and topical transference come into play, in the intersubjective and group aspects, in which archaic experiences emerge, and relationships are dominated by the phantoms of devouring, incorporating, fragmenting with partial and split objects.

The concept of obscenity therefore arises as a figural element of that archaic background of the emotional field that links the primary scene to the imaginary, the mythical and the virtual. It is this that makes the primary scene an essential imaginary reference in the suture of the work of the originary, and therefore of the possibility of accessing the dimension of the inaccessible unconscious, of that dimension that Merleau-Ponty referred to the concepts of “meat” and “chiasma” and which Bion calls the proto-mental system, in which the physical and the mental, the individual and the group, are indistinct, and which only the mythical and imaginary dimensions can represent.

Blood everywhere

“Blood everywhere”, an image that returns, obsessive and disturbing, in the notes of *Cogitations*. Bion draws this image from the clinic of his psychotic patients and attempts a strenuous formalization within the problem of common sense and the epistemology of Braithwaite, Bradley, Hume, Poincaré. In the end Bion realizes that there is a gap between the analyst’s scientific vision and the patient’s one, that there is no chosen fact that can give coherence to what the patient sees, and that the analyst *does not* see, that the blood that the patient describes as scattered everywhere is common sense transformed, experienced as dangerous and persecutory, because he believes he is crazy, because he has always felt himself different from the others,

with whom he has no common sense, for which he refuses any interpretation, with violence, and to the analyst's synthesis he replies with the split:

“The blood -common sense- the seed in which it drives, is dangerous and bad. It is all bizarre objects. It's a burst of laughter, sexual laughter; noise, horn, drills, din. It is a kind of orgasm that cannot be contained within a disciplined framework. This disciplined framework is reason, mathematics, logic. The analyst becomes an object that is very scary [...] This situation works against any progress in the analysis; no healing can occur because no infantile mechanism can be renounced. And there is nothing that can be taken inside because it immediately conflicts with the goal of taking something else inside. Cigars *and* breast milk, baby food *and* caviar [...] The projective identification of food: it is asceticism and gorging. Megalomania. The story of having to be everything as well as *having* everything. Common sense produces, from this point of view, a restrictive state of mind, common sense is in conflict with megalomaniac narcissism. Without common sense, fantasy can be felt as a fact” (Bion, 1992, 45-6). Tr. by the author.

Bion is one step away from discovering the fundamental mechanisms of hallucinosis, but struggles, with difficulty, in twisted descriptions, as if he were practicing playing an unwritten score, alternating clinical pieces of poetic virtuosity with cold pieces of epistemology. In this chaos he tries to maintain direction: replacing the alpha function to the Freudian attention, and draw on personal and collective myth to develop interpretation. And yet, it will still be years before he can recognize that the psychoanalyst must see the hallucinations that the patient sees, and describe hallucinosis as a pathological defense and omnipresent state in everyone's mind. More than the coherence and progression of theoretical thinking is therefore the living and torn flesh of the clinic that emerges from these extraordinary descriptions. Bion introduces us to the heart of the turmoil that in the quiet of the analysis room can attack us unexpectedly, as *Somnus* attacked Palinuro, violently throwing him into the sea, and taking Aeneas' ship off course on a quiet night of calm sea. And this turmoil can make its way through usual images and words, which maintain traces of disturbing elements, so that the archaic and the most disturbing primitive can suddenly emerge even in the most unthinkable situations. Archaic elements that often have to do with blood and sex, with the sacred and the myth, so with the expression “blood everywhere” Bion really seems to evoke something very primitive. And this something, of course, is configured as the primary scene or rather the relationship between the primary scene, PS↔D positions and Oedipal myth. A problem that naturally has to do with the space and the emotional experiences of the group members when they find themselves face to face in the empty space of a circle. The oedipal situation, as content of knowledge, is therefore associated with Pythagora's theorem, while Positions, PS↔D, are associated with the acquisition of knowledge.

Bion is aware of the clues that connect the isosceles triangle to sexuality, but the problem that seems to pose is not so much the sexual emotion connected to the oedipal triangle, but the relationship between space and emotion, and the progressive abstraction of the concepts that formalize this relationship.

The hypothesis is that geometric constructions originally referred to biological realities such as emotions and endeavored to represent them. Bion (1992) therefore suggests that the image of blood everywhere can be reabsorbed, as in a film that is rewound, to the point of showing the “murder in the mirror”. But who is the killer who is reflected in the pool of blood that he himself has generated and who are the victim or the victims? Bion seems to place violence now in the patient, now in the analyst, and of course in the analytical situation, and he hopes to save his role through the use of alpha elements, almost to avoid any sensory contact with the image of blood everywhere (*ibidem*). Bion therefore puts forward the hypothesis that between the primary scene and the algebraic calculation there can be a relationship of this type **sensory experience**→**hieroglyphic ideogram**→**Euclidean geometry**→**algebraic calculation**. It is a process that goes towards a progressive abstraction, but that can also go back and move from algebraic calculation to empirically verifiable facts. The hypothesis is therefore that the fate of the primary scene may evolve from an actual sensorial experience, *a fact*, to an increasingly abstract situation. Bion does not start looking for murderers and victims, but rather lets his image act as a poetic metaphor that pierces the empty armor and empty shells of our habit. And in that context of order, in which he tries to contain chaos, that image of “blood everywhere” seems to suggest a primary scene of violence, perhaps the founding scene of every primary group scene. And yet it is only in his work on the caesura that Bion (1987) manages to associate blood with the sacrum when he observes that terms such as “bloody cunt”, and “bloody vagina”, do not have a sexual meaning properly, neither physiological, nor anatomical, but they have a very archaic quality, capable of causing a certain uproar in anyone who receives it.

The scene of the Skiste odos, a group violence scene that would not leave Tarantino’s fans disappointed, could therefore be a perfect realization of the expression “blood everywhere”. We must therefore ask ourselves why Bion does not refer to this scene, nor to the primary scene of the primitive horde as imagined by Freud in *Totem and Taboo*. Bion comes to the idea of sacred through images of blood and sex, but he drops this intuition that Freud and anthropology had widely covered. Durkheim, Mauss and Hubert consider totemism the original religion and the Totem as a sacred reserve. Force arising from the collective consciousness of the group, the sacred symbolized by the Totem, becomes the soul of religion. All this is present in the theory of the primitive horde and the collective murder of the father, which Freud places at the origin of social organization, morals and religion. Freud (1932) understood that violence is at the basis of every society and every institution, and that law is nothing more than the “triumph over violence”, in the union of the weakest

against the overpowering of the individual, but cannot develop the theory of sacrifice which he himself indicates because it is in contrast with the primacy of sexuality in the Oedipus complex. In fact Freud (1912) discovers the “necessity” of that collective murder, starting from the conception of the primordial horde of Darwin, in which a jealous father keeps all the women to himself and drives away his children, but is unable to see in this murder nothing more than the killing of the father for the conquest of the females. Freud comes very close to understanding the mechanism of the expiatory victim and for a good part follows this track, when evoking the “tragic guilt”, he goes so far as to say that the tragic hero must take on the faults of the Chorus itself, the ranks of the brothers: “Thus the tragic hero is transformed, without him wanting him, into savior and liberator of the Choir” (*ibidem*). Freud even goes so far as to evoke the pains of the “divine goat Dionysus” and link this myth to the Passion of Christ, whose sacrifice leads to reconciliation with the God-father. For Freud the son takes the place of the Father and becomes God himself, and the ancient totemic meal takes the form of communion, in which the ranks of the brothers consume the flesh and blood of the son, and no longer of the Father. The Eucharist, the totemic meal, the sacrifice of the ideal object, its oral incorporation, therefore have elements in common and can be seen as a binding force for the community, which makes the group a single substance, supra-individual and divine. The incorporation of the divine body is therefore an invariant element of cultures distant in time and space and represents a central moment in community life. In this sense - totemic meal, sacrifice of the ideal object, eucharist- they can be interpreted as founding acts of the group, which fulfill the primary function of making the group a single body, which transcends individuality and at the same time symbolically and concretely realizes the mystical union in the body of Christ. In totemism and in religion the most radical opposites therefore coincide, good and bad, prohibited and lawful, so the forbidden totemic animal is periodically sacrificed. Hence the duality of sacrificial behavior, in which the rite presents itself in the form of a guilty and necessary killing at the same time, a desirable and sacrilegious transgression. Allowed and forbidden, lawful and unlawful, they continually turn upside down in the game of violence and sacrifice, whereby sacrificial immolation, initially criminal, turns upside down in holiness, sacrifices and feasts coincide, there is no party without sacrifice. Freud’s hypothesis is therefore that every ritual practice, every mythical meaning, has its origin in a real killing. Sacrifice is what is in the rite, because at first it was something else and because it retains something else as a model, it is not simply a simulacrum of a crime that no one has ever committed.

Psychoanalysis, however, has never been able to assimilate *Totem and Taboo*, considered nothing more than a fantasy, an idea likely shared by Bion too. Fornari (1976,188) acknowledges that the law arises from the will of society to reassure itself that man is not killed by another man, making the echo of the primitive horde of Freud resound: “Every human society is based on reassurance against the anxiety that

every man could kill or be killed by another man". But it is Girard (1972) who takes the trouble to defend this "strange and magnificent" text, "truer than any psychoanalysis", which more than any other approaches the expiatory victim's hypothesis. Girard reevaluates Freud's hypothesis of collective murder and totemism itself, to which he recognizes the merit of restoring importance to religious phenomena. However, his defense turns into a rambling denigration of psychoanalysis when Freud renounces taking the scapegoat mechanism to its extreme consequences. Freud cannot use the Oedipus King who in fact relates to the guilt of an actual patricide as it would call into question his interpretation of the complex that makes Oedipus the simple victim of his unconscious childhood desires. Girard then re-reads the tragedy in the light of his mimetic theory which sees the drama revolving around the conflict between Oedipus and Tiresias and between Oedipus and Creon. And conflict is always a conflict linked to mimetic rivalry, because it is always an imitation of the opponent. Each of the two antagonists wants the same thing, wants what the other wants, wants power, triumphs over the other. It is always a conflict of desires. At first there is an imitation of desire, which focuses on a specific object, the object of rivalry, but over time the object can also disappear to make way for the mutual obsession of the quarrels, the duels of Conrad. The two antagonists imitate each other and mimesis triggers violence, a mimetic and symmetrical violence, which triggers revenge and feuds and tends to generalize. The mimetic contagion is born which can be stopped only by sacrifice, collective murder, which through the mechanism of the scapegoat brings peace. So the victim, the cause of the disorder, becomes the cause of the return to social order, the scapegoat becomes the founding father.

Fragments

First scene. "A lake of blood instead of Paris".

Jean Deichel, the lead writer of *Hold your crown stead*, Yannick Haenel's visionary and extraordinary book, walks the streets of Paris, and sees "an immense lake of blood", which runs from Place de la Concorde to the Arc de Triomphe. Jean is used to visions, his is a dreamlike life, between alcohol and film, but this image is different; police, armed men, passers-by full of horror remind him that there has been an attack in Paris. More than a hundred dead, the Bataclan massacre. Here is the epiphany of the sacred: "Do you know what the sacred is? The sacred is when the affair explodes", and among his visionary memories appears the video of the Isis of the throat cut of an American journalist, as a warning that "the ritual never stops". Jean spends his days drinking alcohol and watching movies. He sees and revises *The Deer Hunter*, *Il Cacciatore* by Michael Cimino and *Apocalypse Now* by Francis Ford Coppola, in search of the crime hidden behind every moment and the white deer of truth. Haenel knows that within every moment there is a crime, that there is a scene that nobody witnesses, that doesn't take place anywhere, but that secretly determines

our every act. This is the scene that Jean searches day and night, watching films, obsessively. At the basis of the sacred, as of the institution, there is therefore always violence, as Freud understood. It is sacrifice and murder that secretly regulate world history. Murder is the very framework of time; each act, in secret, conceals a murder that is already present in the eye of the predator, as the myth of Actaeon and Diana tells. Haenel rethinks the myth of hunting to understand the close link between death and life, between sacrifice and creativity. The hunt is spiritual, Haenel says, in it the myth of Diana described by Ovid is repeated. The hunter, without knowing it, pursues nudity every time, because game is only an alibi of his hidden desire, which is to “run into Diana, reveal the forbidden body of the goddess”. In the hunt something miraculous or terrible takes place, when the hunter becomes the knife, the throat, the breath, the wound, and in that stealthy light that shines on the blade, the smile of the goddess is reflected. A successful hunt implies that the hunter must have defeated the animal before shooting, must have been confronted with him all night and by dint of chasing him through the woods he must have emptied himself of everything that separates him from the animal. So hunter and prey become the same thing, but if the hunter pulls the trigger, everything ends in a flash of death. Not so in the Cimino film, where De Niro takes aim but gives up shooting the deer. And it is precisely from this *renunciation* that literature begins for Haenel, because it is in the renunciation of giving death that it opens up to creativity. In the myth, the virgin Diana, surprised naked at the source, does not tolerate the gaze of Actaeon, and red in the face, turns her gaze towards him, transforming him from a hunter to a prey. For Actaeon-deer, all that remains is to die torn to pieces by his own dogs. And the male writer Jean (and perhaps Haenel himself) cannot understand, he must ask Lena where Actaeon was wrong. Lena’s answer is disarming in its truth: Actaeon looked at Diana with predatory eyes, looked at her like a bitch, while she should have stopped “peeking and jumping into the water”, looking at her with the eyes of love. The white deer can therefore be the scared deer of Cimino, but also the white whale of Melville, the Polish Knight of Rembrandt, any image that evokes the event to which the flight of the animal through the woods refers, “the voice of sacrifice that crosses the ages and reveals the plot under appearances”.

Second scene. Birthday party

In the film *Parasite*, by Bong Joon-ho, the birthday of the youngest son is celebrated in the garden of the Park house. Beautiful people, who play classical instruments, who converse, who wander gracefully in a beautiful meadow, indifferent to the disasters of the storm that devastated the homes of the poor in the lower part of the city. The magnificent villa is on a hill, a modern representation of Olympus. Called by Mrs. Park to serve the guests, the Kim who spent the night in a gym with hundreds of people displaced by the flood arrive. Kim’s son watches the party from the bedroom window of Park’s teenage daughter, who teaches English. What does he have to do with all that beauty, he who still has the drama of the night and the misery

of a lifetime in his eyes? The girl, in love with him, kisses him. Encouraged he goes down, but first decides to close the accounts with the ex housekeeper of Parker house and her husband. The Kim family had a violent confrontation with them in the villa's secret bunker. The ex housekeeper, however, is already dead. The husband, devastated by pain, is furious and gets the better of the boy, who hits the head with the same stone with which the boy wanted to kill them. Then, like a ghost, he goes out into the garden while the pool of blood is spreading everywhere, and pounces with a knife against the boy's mother, who kills, but is killed by her. The scene is violent, confused, difficult to understand who kills who, the father of the Park asks for the car keys to help the children, but he is blocked by disgust for the smell of the ex- housekeeper's husband, the smell of the poor, the smell of Kim. Kim's father then turns the knife on Park father and kills him.

Bong Joon-ho's film, Palme d'Or in Cannes (2019), and now also 4 Oscar winner, moves between surreal comedy, social satire, thriller, someone called it a comedy of misunderstandings, forgetting that such definition has also been used for tragedy, starting with Oedipus King. And there is no doubt that the Parasite planting is that of classical tragedy, even if it sinks its claws into the flesh of the current social drama. In Parasite, parasites are members of the Kim family who are settling with deception themselves in the home of the wealthy Parkers, parasite is the husband of the ex housekeeper, who has lived for four years in a secret bunker of the villa. But parasites are also Parkers who live in the most total indifference of the social drama that surrounds them. The situation begins as a comedy of deceptions, light, almost comical, like the drizzle that accompanies the first scenes in the basement where the Kim, father, mother and two young children live, who must manage to survive, stealing the Wi-Fi signal from neighbors a little less poor than them, eating frugal meals while drunk people urinating in front of their windows. They must also defend themselves against parasites, the real ones, so much so that they risk suffocating in a fortuitous disinfestation. The installation in the Parkers' house proceeds relentlessly with perfect deceptions, first the son, then the daughter, the mother and the father, all are hired in the Parker house. The situation seems to be working, but the unexpected return of the ex-governed on a stormy night, while the Parkers are at the campsite to celebrate the birthday of their young son, portends the drama. The ex-housekeeper's husband has been living in a secret bunker for years to escape creditors, and admits to living well now. A war between the poor erupts between the two families of parasites, with continuous reversals, and an unprecedented ferocity. The Kims have the upper hand and return to the surface, in the room, which they have made similar to their home for the previous revelry. The return of the Park is in the air, the Kim manage to clean up by putting the waste under the carpet and hiding under the sofa, except for the mother who cooks for the Park. On the sofa, the Park try a sexual approach, disturbed by the smell of the Kim, which they can't stand. The garden party puts an end to this tragicomic situation, and causes violence to break through with the ferocity of a sacrificial crisis.

In both scenes the image of “blood everywhere” returns, obsessive; in the lake of blood in Paris; in the garden of the Park house, where the pool of blood mixes with the plum juice of the party. And also the scene of the party returns, musical at Bataclan, at the birthday in the Park house, to remember that party and sacrifice represent one and the same rite. We must therefore think that truly “the rite never stops”, that the myth continues to live with us, among us, that the powerful forces that it conveys, are able to pierce our contemporaneity, rather than they use the new media to spread in a viral way. Aren't the desert scenes of Isis rituals, sacrificial rites, which the web spreads like viruses that infect our consciences? The most primitive scene in the history of humanity, the murder in the desert, enters our homes, through monitors that are always on, involving everyone, because as Haenel warns “no one, not even the survivors, escapes the logic of sacrifice ... The circle of sacrifice is unlimited, so death, when it strikes over some, affects us all; thus we become bodies in a sacrificial state, bodies that can be sacrificed at all times”.

The return of Dionysus

“Here I am, *Hkw*”. “I have come to this Theban land, the son of Zeus, Dionysus, who Semele, born of Cadmus, gave birth one day forced to give birth by the fire of lightning” (vv.1-4). This is the extraordinary incipit with which Euripides describes in the *Bacchantes* the coming of Dionysus, the god of the mask, of ambiguity, of the dissolving of all forms, of liminality and the fluidization of borders. Dionysus suddenly breaks in, and Thebes resounds with his cry, while the women of Thebes advance in the city to the sound of the eardrums, because everyone must see his coming, the epiphany of the god. A god who seems to rise every time from elsewhere -abroad, a barbarian world, beyond world- and who always comes to conquer new places in his cult, sowing disorder and death. But in the *Bacchantes* Dionysus returns to his hometown, Thebes, the same where his cousin Pentheus fights his cult and who later will give birth to Oedipus. After much wandering, Dionysus returns to take revenge, because the mother's sisters did not want to recognize his divine nature. It is therefore in Thebes that Dionysus wants to be recognized, it is in Thebes that he wants to reveal himself in his divine nature. For this reason, he has “injected madness” into the women of Thebes and induced them to dance among the cliffs of the Citerone. Dionysus, the “foreigner” who came from Asia, is therefore a native of Thebes, the new god, foreign to Greek culture, in reality “has the force of law and is rooted in nature” (v. 895). The other, therefore, is us. Unpresentable divinity, which we would not like to recognize, Dionysus has always concerned us, we would like to keep him away, but he is rooted in us, and he returns, disturbing, like the Freudian uncanny.

Why Dionysus? In his analysis of the use of myth as a cognitive model of individual and collective psychic life, Corrao (1992), introduces the myth of Dionysus, as an antithetical model to that of Oedipus: the myth of Dionysus is crossed by a kind of

unrestrained hypomaniac, with expressions of “ease, freedom (*eleuthería*), joy and pain, cruelty and excitement”, as opposed to the myth of Oedipus, in which guilt (*aitía*) and responsibility dominates. An opposition that recalls that between Apollo and Dionysus, established by Nietzsche in the footsteps of Rodhe, and which presupposes an extraneousness of Dionysism with respect to Greek culture. Subsequent research, however, has shown that the name of Dionysus already appears in the Mycenaean documents, for which he probably preceded Apollo himself to Delphi (Vernant, 1986). Aristotle, moreover, states that the origin of the tragedy dates back to dithyramb, song and dance in honor of Dionysus. Nietzsche’s great intuition remains of a Dionysus bearer of the spirit of the “formless”, of the “dissolution” of all forms, in opposition to Apollo god of the “form”; dichotomy that opens the space of tragedy, as an expression of a radical cognitive contradiction, of a form that at the same time suspends and reveals contradiction and chaos.

But leaving the complex question of the origin of the Dionysian and his ties with the tragedy to anthropologists, we can say with Corrao that Dionysus is from the beginning a collective, social god, inseparable from the *tiaso*, the group of satyrs and Bacchantes. The *tiaso* is an organized group of faithful who practice trance in a ritual way, not to evoke healing from a disease, as in Coribanti, nor to escape the human condition. Its aim, as Vernant (1986) shows, is rather to obtain a change of state in a ritual way, in a wild setting, through dance and music. Dionysism does not use techniques of asceticism and renunciation, nor does it promise happiness elsewhere, rather it allows access to an exaltation in the here and now, confusing the frontiers of the divine and the human, communicating what is separate, through the trance and possession, which realize the experience of becoming something else, reversing models, norms and values. It is therefore through the loss of boundaries, between real and imaginary, between possible and impossible, through unbridled joy and without responsibility, thanks to the wine and the anesthesia of all pain, that Dionysus leads to almighty exaltation. It is no coincidence that Dionysus “gave mortals the wine that frees us from pain” (v.772). His eruption subverts the order, confuses, promises joy, in an experience that puts you in contact with the immense and mysterious forces of ecstatic experience and collective exaltation in group rituals. And these rituals are accepted by the community, even by the old Cadmus and Tiresias, who in a reversal of values, accuse Pentheus of being *anomos*, out of law, or foreigner, he the king, who tries to restore order in his own city. Actually Dionysus seduces, enters the city with deception, disguised as a foreigner, he is the god of “theatrical illusion”, of the “mask”, which through his disguise has the task of preparing for his authentic revelation, which leads to happiness his faithful, and to death who has not been able to recognize him.

Omnipotence, what has not been recognized to Dionysus, is therefore the real prize with which the god seduces his followers, the Bacchantes, and the city itself. His

inexhaustibility overflows therefore towards omnipotence, without borders, in the destructiveness that abolishes every difference, supported by hate and resentment, and multiplied by drunkenness and ecstasy, erotic unrestrainedness and excitement, typical of collective manifestations. This would be enough to bring Dionysus closer to infantile omnipotence, to the “unrecognized”, vindictive, envious child in us, to the other that the reasons for refusal and non-recognition have nourished anger and resentment, incapable of growth, of autonomy, always ready to emerge suddenly to claim his rights, real or presumed. Penteo is his double, and as Oedipus wants to know, to see the Maenads in their rituals, to do this he lets himself be disguised as a woman, becoming similar to a Maenad and to the effeminate god himself, who seduces him with the deception and the promise of to be able to access secrets, to “see what must not be seen” (vv.911-2). Penteo hides to observe, to spy on the mother and her host, therefore to watch the primary scene. And in the euphoric excitement, Penteo sees double and feels so omnipotent to “carry on the shoulders in addition to the Menadas, even the cliffs of the Citerone” (vv. 945-6). Unlike Oedipus, Pentheus therefore exercises a fraudulent curiosity, wants to enter the mystery of the parent couple, to witness the sacred event of creation, as Nietzsche claimed, which praises the Dionysian, as an expression of the super-man, almighty. But the story of Dionysus is a tragedy with no escape, marked forever by abjection, non-recognition and dismemberment (*sparagmos*). Unlike Oedipus, Dionysus is not collected and raised by a loving family that recognizes his right to life. Dionysus, an orphan of a mother, manages to become an adult thanks to a series of vicissitudes and divine interventions, but does not avoid the experience of death and even the agony of the sparagmos, of being torn apart by the Titans, and devoured. Thanks to Rea, the Great Mother, Dionysus regains his life and is entrusted to Persephone, then to Atamante, and finally to the Nymphs, who mark his indissoluble link with the group. Dionysus wanders the world, following a frenetic group of Satyrs and Bacchants, armed with thyrsus, snakes and eardrums, until he returns to Thebes, his hometown, where he pushes women to his cult on Mount Citerone. Dionysus-Bacchus, also known as Bromio, the noisy, then leads the chorus of the Maenads, “eager for the blood of the killed goat, joy of raw devoured flesh” (vv.141-2). Dionysus therefore went through the most ferocious cruelties, separated from the body of the dead mother, disowned, torn to pieces, which only a group manages to hold together, illusorily, as in the play of the mirror, in the version of the myth of Proclus. And the mirror, in which the multiplicity of the one is revealed, and the illusory unity of the multiple, is the image proper to the obscenity of this ambiguous and destructive figure that diffuses and projects in the group of its followers, in a continuous reversal of roles, concrete representation of his being “in pieces” and a “group” life. Dionysus’ true passion is therefore revenge, dismemberment; enjoyment through orgy, organ ecstasy; and the reversal of every value, even knowledge. “What is knowledge?” (v.897). Everything is illusion, wisdom is not wisdom, neither that of new techniques, nor that of ancient knowledge, including the new knowledge of the tragedy itself, which with

Bacchantes turns to sunset. In the case of Dionysus, even Girard's theory appears weak, because the sacrificial dimension of the Bacchantes belongs more to the register of destructive revenge than to ritual sacrifice. Every limit is destroyed, nothing remains; nor of human knowledge, which is not wisdom; nor of priestly knowledge, now comic in the words of old Tiresias; nor of the palace, which collapsed (Rella, 1993). Dionysus, the god of liminality, of the dissolution of borders, brought his work to completion until irreparable chaos, when everything gets confused, even joy and pain: "It was all one cry. He moaned, as long as he continued to breathe, and they let out shouts of joy" (vv.1131-2). This is how Euripides describes the torture of Pentheus, dismembered by the Bacchantes, the mother in the head, in a scene that no painter, except for some nineteenth-century paintings, has ever dared truly represent. There is no peace or order so that they can be restored, nothing returns as before.

Oedipus' passion is therefore an immense desire to know, but it remains a cognitive drive, which will lead him to the tragic recognition of the human condition; Dionysus' passion is instead to destroy, to create chaos, in the refusal of differences and limits, fueled by resentment, revenge and the boundless need for recognition. Dionysus has never left the primary scene, he has never been able to distance himself, the group of his caregivers continually repeats scenes of ferocious filicide, Atamante kills his son Learco, Lycurgus the son of Dryas, and he will push Agave to tear his son Pentheus apart, continually repeating the primary scene of the *sparagmos*, of the tearing apart, of the child torn to pieces and eaten. It is the reversal foreseen by Bion, from abstraction to the sensory scene, from algebraic geometry to the fact. Neri and Gatti (1987) hypothesize that curiosity ultimately discovers three primordial crimes behind the primary scene: parricide-infanticide (Laius), incest (Jocasta), cannibalism (The Sphinx). And these primary scenes are considered cognitive approximations to realities that are in themselves unattainable. In other words, the primary scenes express the propulsion of primordial tensions towards representability, which can also emerge suddenly in situations of apparent tranquility. It is the birthday scene in the Park house, where violence suddenly breaks out, from unknown depths, into a situation of apparent harmony and beauty. It's the pool of blood that runs through Paris, it's the blood everywhere that prevents Bion's patient from lying on the couch. A primary scene can therefore be expressed suddenly and automatically, and this character often causes it to take the path of the body, because the approach to the area of conscious emotion is not tolerated. This is why the soma-psychotic emergency is not linked "to the representation of the emotional life, but to its failure" (Chiozza, 1985). In psychosomatic situations Bion (1980) states that "There is no real intermediate phase between the expression of the impulse, or fear, and its implementation. So the stage is ready for a sudden catastrophe".

After the end

What is left after the end of the Greek tragedy? The tragic remains, the condition of human life that has never finished accompanying us, as shown by the tragic structure of *Parasite*, and the paradoxes of our existence. According to Floridi (2015), today the members of the G-7 all live in hyperstory, because not only are they based on information, which characterizes history, starting at least from the invention of writing, but they depend on intangible, founded assets on the use of information, rather than on material goods. However, a virus, Covid-19, was enough to make us discover the importance of objects, and perhaps the desire for true relationships, contacts, skin, eyes, and emotions. When a mask, a respirator, make the difference between life and death, when a word that touches, an affective presence, the closeness of the other, make the difference between well-being and panic, then we understand that those media they can be useful, indeed very useful, but which do not replace our life. Made of bodies and blood, even of “blood everywhere” and simple objects.

I rethought the group Oedipus and the primary scene, to understand that the Oedipus has always been a group, that there is no family without the group and the social, and even the cultural and environment in which we live and which requires today the utmost care. In the development of field theory, Gregory Bateson occupies a central place alongside Merleau-Ponty. In his tireless search for the structures and forms of life, Bateson had come to favor the aesthetics and the idea of a fundamental unifying beauty. The traces of the living are the symmetries, the spirals, the proportions, the organization, the connections, the structures that connect ... In this perspective, the mind becomes a reflection of vast numerous portions of the natural world outside the thinking being. Bateson (1972) understood that Darwin’s evolutionary theory contained a serious error regarding the identification of the survival unit in the context of natural selection: “The survival unit is neither the organism nor the family, nor society”, but the “flexible organism-in-its-environment complex”. The mental unity therefore becomes anything related to the interaction between differentiated parts. It is therefore impossible to think of circumscribing the Oedipus and the primary scene to the facts relating to the family, which however maintains the fundamental task of mediating in the child the pain and traumatic nature of the real and of course the development of the mind. The family is body, blood, links, affections, including hate and destructiveness; it has boundaries, which must work, how cell membranes work; letting in what feeds and hindering what destroys. We must therefore think that thoughts are like viruses; have a viral behavior, and penetrate everywhere. The war between realists and idealists is never over. Much less at the level of the primary scene. Freud himself has always oscillated between a realist vision and a phantasmic vision of the primary scene. Today, the new media make us aware that this war does not make sense, that real and virtual are increasingly confused, contaminated, interpenetrated, as conscious and unconscious. The problem is not whether the primary scene is real or not, fact or fantasy, *the*

primary scene, as an event, the field of emotional happening, is always real. The problem is whether the primary scene can be transformed, mentalized, and what is its destiny in the development of the child, the group and perhaps the community. The hypotheses of Meltzer and Gaburri allow us to mediate between the Nician and Freudian conception of the primary scene, between knowledge understood as sinking into reality and escape into fantasy. The internal world does not arise from a removal of perception, nor from an escape to fantasy, nor from introspection, but from a continuous comparison with the perception of reality, in aesthetic conflict, in questioning the differences between the perception of beauty external and internal, between surface and depth, starting from Bionian “*at-one-ment*”, that emotional unison, which for Civitarese (2018) represents the zero degree of the invariant, I→EU, or mother-infant union, which in its repeated experiences of encounter opens up the creation of meaning, in a game of comparison/recognition that allows the exit from the primordial chaos. It is in this meeting that the experience of being is created for Winnicott (1971), the child and the object are one, “the breast is the self and the self is the breast”. And the unison theory represents the true basis of Bion’s aesthetic paradigm, as it finds meaning in the area of sense, understood as a form of implicit or aesthetic knowledge, even before semantics. In this going in time, in these repeated encounters between mother and child, what Tronik (1998) calls “dyadic expansion of consciousness” takes place, in which the shared co-creation of meaning reduces chaos and entropy, able to promote growth and development, increasing consistency and complexity. And this process is a continuous state of meaning which implies various forms of awareness and unconsciousness, such as the Unthought Known of Bollas, rêverie and mentalization. When these processes work, when the emotional field in which the child is immersed is adequate, then development is likely to occur in a harmonious way, that the child acquires an adequate ability to metabolize events, to introject the function of thought itself, to live with one’s internal fantsms or as Meltzer says with one’s gods, and finally to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly, between good and evil. And yet we must ask ourselves whether today the infosphere, the confusion between real and virtual, or rather the loss of the boundaries between real and virtual, has not created a new situation, which perhaps, in our Coronavirus times, shows all the paradoxes of a world that has become extremely powerful and at the same time extremely fragile.

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